We study the problem of anonymizing data with quasi-sensitive attributes. Quasi-sensitive attributes are not sensitive by themselves, but certain values or their combinations may be linked to external knowledge to reveal indirect sensitive information of an individual. We formalize the notion of l-diversity and t-closeness for quasi-sensitive attributes, which we call QS l-diversity and QS t-closeness, to prevent indirect sensitive attribute disclosure. We propose a two-phase anonymization algorithm that combines quasiidentifying value generalization and quasi-sensitive value suppression to achieve QS l-diversity and QS t-closeness.
INTRODUCTION
Privacy-preserving data publishing or data anonymization [2] has received considerable attention in recent years as a promising approach for sharing useful information while preserving data privacy. In a typical non-interactive scenario, a data publisher (e.g. hospital) collects and stores data from record owners (e.g. patients), referred to as microdata, and then releases a sanitized view of the data to a data recipient (e.g. public health researchers) for querying or analysis purposes.
There are two important disclosure risks associated with the released data. Identity disclosure occurs if an individual can be identified from released data. Attribute disclosure occurs when a sensitive attribute is revealed and can be attributed to an individual. Given a microdata table, several subsets of attributes have been considered in light of the disclosure risks [2] : identifiers (I) which explicitly identify record owners and are typically removed from the released data, quasi-identifiers (QI) which could be linked with external information to re-identify individual record owners, and sensitive attributes (S) which should be protected. Most existing work that aim to prevent attribute disclosure, based on notable principles such as l-diversity [5] and t-closeness [4] , consider explicit sensitive attributes. However, in practice, many attributes, especially set-valued attributes, may not be sensitive by themselves, but certain values or their combinations may be linked to external knowledge to reveal sensitive information of an individual. We refer to this kind of attributes as quasi-sensitive attributes. [5] . Unfortunately, due to the high dimensionality and sparsity, not only the dataset will be over-generalized but also it is still possible to link the individual to a unique hidden sensitive value. Contributions. This paper provides the first study towards preventing indirect sensitive information disclosure due to the quasi-sensitive attribute values. Figure 2 illustrates the problem space of related disclosure risks and our contributions. Our first contribution is to formalize the notion of l-diversity and t-closeness for quasi-sensitive attribute values, which we call QS l-diversity and QS t-closeness, to prevent indirect attribute disclosure due to external knowledge. Our second contribution is a two-phase algorithm that combines generalization and value suppression to achieve QS l-diversity and QS t-closeness. In the first phase, generalization on the QI attributes is used to produce an intermediate dataset. In the second phase, we propose a novel and effective QS attribute value suppression algorithm, which uses greedy heuristics but adaptively updates the solution within a time bound. With initial empirical evaluations, we demonstrate that our approach is practical and effective.
DEFINITION AND ALGORITHM

QS l-diversity and QS t-closeness
In this section, we introduce the definitions for quasisensitive attributes and our attack scenario and formalize the privacy principles. We use D and D * to denote the original and released microdata tables respectively.
Definition 1 (Quasi-sensitive attribute values). A set of attribute values are quasi-sensitive (QS) if they are not sensitive by themselves but can be linked with external data to reveal sensitive information of individuals.
We aim to prevent indirect attribute disclosure attacks through the QS attributes. In such an attack, we assume an adversary knows: i) the existence of a victim individual tp in D, and ii) the exact QI values of tp, denoted as q. The adversary also has access to an external knowledge table E, similar to that in [1] , which associates a set of attribute values (also referred to as terms or items) to a piece of sensitive information (referred to as sensitive label). Formally, each row in E is a pair (L i, Si), i = 1, 2, ..., |E|, where Li is a sensitive label and S i is a corresponding set of quasi-sensitive attribute values. 
Definition 2 (Linking to sensitive labels).
In our example shown in Figure 1 , Symptoms is a quasisensitive set-valued attribute. The external Below we analyze the prior and posterior beliefs of linking an individual to a sensitive label and define quasi-sensitive l-diversity and t-closeness to bound the change of beliefs. Prior belief. The attacker's prior belief, denoted by α (q,L) , is the probability that a targeted individual tp with QIvector value q is linked to a label L in the external table before the data release. The attacker's prior belief about the sensitive label results only from his background knowledge. Given the external knowledge table E, s/he could estimate each label's frequencies in the microdata by counting the labels' accumulated frequencies in the mapped knowledge sets. Posterior belief. After observing the released dataset D * , the attacker's belief changes. The posterior belief, denoted by β (q,L) , measures the probability that QI-vector value q (contained in QI-group G in D * ) is linked to a sensitive label L in external table E. We have:
Here P (tp i→L) is the probability that the tuple tpi in G is linked to L. Obviously, P L∈K(tp i ) (P (tpi→L) = 1, but the specific value of P (tpi→L) may vary. For simplicity, we assume
We now define principles QS l-diversity and QS t-closeness based on the l-diversity and t-closeness principles respectively to bound the difference of the prior and posterior beliefs. For the l-diversity definition, since (c,l)-diversity is the most powerful and well-adopted version, we define QS l-diversity based on (c,l)-diversity. For simplicity and computational efficiency, we will define the distance as:
Definition 3 (QS (c,l)-diversity). Suppose we have the values of β (q,L) for each of the
L in ∪ d i=1 K(tpi),d(β (q, * ) , α (q, * ) ) = ( X ∀L (β (q,L) − α (q,L) ) 2 ) 1/2
Algorithm
Two-phase anonymization. To achieve the above privacy requirements, we propose an anonymization approach that combines generalization of QI values with suppression of QS values.
Phase 1 (QI generalization). Given D, and an integer k >= 1, we obtain an intermediate dataset D
g that satisfies k-anonymity. There exists many generalization algorithms [2] such as [3] that can be used to obtain a D g .
Phase 2 (QS suppression). Given D g , the QI groups that do not satisfy QS (c,l)-diversity or QS t-closeness will be identified. For these groups, we propose a suppression algorithm to remove proper QS values (items) until the group satisfies QS (c,l)-diversity or QS t-closeness.
The generalization helps to reduce the work needed in the second step and enhances the overall performance of the system, which we will analyze in Section 3. In fact, when k=1, the system degenerates to the special case in which no generalization is used, and QI groups can be formed by simply putting tuples sharing the same QI values together. For QS suppression, we propose a novel algorithm that uses greedy heuristics but adaptively updates the solution within a time bound.
Cost metric for QS suppression. While various metrics could be used to measure the information loss or cost associated with item removal, in order to maximize the utility of the final output for the suppression phase, we suggest the "inverse weighted cost" metric.
Suppose there is a group of d tuples and each tuple has a row of w i sensitive terms. When a term is removed from a row with w i terms left, we accumulate the total cost by 1/w i , and in the end the cost of all the removed terms is summed up. In this metric, the added cost increases if one keeps removing terms from the same row, which also reflects the impact of the removal to the data utility: the impact is always larger when a sensitive term is removed from a row with less terms left.
Assuming in the end v i terms are removed from the ith tuple, we get the accumulated cost T (normalized by its upperbound):
QS suppression algorithm. A naive approach is to perform a depth-first search as follows. We use a unique number to represent each of the removable QS terms in the to-beprocessed QI group. Starting from the root node which indicates the case that no term is removed, we can traverse the entire search tree where each node represents a unique removal pattern until we finish. An example of a search tree ordered lexicologically is shown in Figure 3 , where the numbers inside curly braces are the tailsets of the nodes, representing the terms that could be removed in the next depth level.
Figure 3: Search Tree for QS Term Suppression
To enhance the performance of the tree traverse, we use adaptive tailset reordering to first explore the most promising branches. Let's first start from the QS (c,l)-diversity based algorithm. Imagine that there is a node with a tailset containing the sensitive terms that have not been removed yet, instead of finishing each of its branches one by one, we can tentatively remove a term in the tailset to move one level down, and get: 1) a number l , which is the largest l such that the group represented by the new node satisfies QS (c,l)-diversity, 2) the accumulated cost from removing a QS term. By testing all the terms in the tailset in one step, we get the l and T related with each of these terms. An "effective removal" always features a great increase in l and a small increase in the cost T , so in a greedy heuristic, it is very natural for us to rank the terms in the tailset by the ratio of the increase in l and the increase in cost T , i.e., Δl /ΔT . Hence we could reorder the tailset in the decreasing order of Δl /ΔT for all the tentatively explored nodes, and continue searching the tree recursively in a depth first manner. The first result is obtained when the first node satisfying QS (c,l)-diversity is detected.
After the first pattern is found through the above greedy heuristics, the algorithm continues to search for a better solution on other branches of the tree. The result is updated when we find a new node that satisfies QS (c,l)-diversity and has a lower cost than the current best result. This process continues until the entire search tree is traversed, so this algorithm generates an optimal solution eventually. This algorithm is greedy in the beginning, but keeps updating the best T so in the end the search is complete. In practice, we can set up a time bound for the algorithm, and mandatorily terminate its execution when time is up. This strategy enables us to find the best solution that we can get in a bounded time period. Similarly, QS t-closeness based algorithm can be also optimized with adaptive tailset reordering. 
EXPERIMENTS
We conducted a set of experiments evaluating the effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed approach. Due to space limitations, we only present the primary results and findings here and refer readers to [6] for more results and more detailed discussions. We implemented the Mondrian generalization algorithm [3] and our suppression algorithm in C++. All experiments are executed on a 2.0 GHz duo core laptop with 2G memory running Windows Vista. The experiments used: 1) a dataset with 3000 tuples augmented from the Adult dataset 1 as D, with 8 QI attributes and 9 synthesized QS terms per tuple, and 2) an external table with 3000 pieces of knowledge labels linked to random QS terms whose appearance in each tuple follows a Poison distribution with λ = 100.
1 http://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/Adult QS Suppression algorithm. With the execution time in each experiment bounded by 10 seconds, we first compare our QS suppression algorithm with the baseline DFS algorithm with respect to a set of algorithmic parameters. Figure 4 summarizes the parameters and their default values. Figure 5 compares the QS (c, l)-diversity based QS suppression algorithm against the baseline DFS algorithm with respect to varying l and c. As is shown, the adaptive algorithm significantly outperforms the baseline DFS without tailset reordering on removal cost. QI generalization and QS suppression. We now present the performance of the overall anonymization approach. For QS t-closeness based approach, we tested the impact of different t on privacy and information loss respectively, shown in Figure 6 . The X axis is t 2 , since we used dsq in the QS suppression algorithm. A direct conclusion is: given a twophase approach, the average removal cost usually goes down when a larger k is used in generalization; in the extreme case with generalization only approach, we have the smallest term removal cost (zero) and the largest information loss from generalization; and in the extreme case with term removal only approach, we have the largest term removal cost and the least generalization.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS
We studied the problem of indirect information disclosure through linking quasi-sensitive attributes with external knowledge. Our experiments show that the proposed term removal algorithm is fast and effective, and the two-phase anonymization approach provides bounded privacy guarantees as well as flexible tradeoff between privacy and utility of the data. Our work continues on several directions including alternative information loss metrics such as [8] for term removal, extensions to the algorithm such as additional suppression to cope with minimality attack [7] , and potential ways to construct external knowledge base.
